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Abstract	
The emergence of an advanced nuclear industry has renewed the pursuit of small modular and 
advanced reactor technologies to supply low carbon energy. By the same token, these 
developments potentially expose gaps in current safeguards practices, particularly for reactor 
designs utilizing novel coolants and fuel forms–underscoring calls for the early application of 
Safeguards-by-Design to effectively and efficiently detect diversion and misuse. Other 
innovations may necessitate additional measures to credibly assure the absence of undeclared 
activities. This paper discusses three types of advanced nuclear and nuclear-related technologies 
as illustrations of these challenges: 1) micronuclear reactors, 2) molten salt reactors, and on the 
balance-of-plant side, 3) thermal energy storage and dry cooling. It then identifies high-level 
safeguards development needs associated with these on-the-horizon technologies so as to elevate 
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Introduction: Perceptions of safeguards 
 
The emergence of an advanced nuclear industry has renewed the pursuit of small modular and 
advanced reactor technologies to supply low carbon energy. Departing significantly from current 
technologies in power output and utilizing new coolants and fuels, these concepts promise 
significant performance advantages over existing technologies.[1] They also potentially expose 
gaps in existing safeguards practices designed to detect the diversion of fissile material and the 
misuse of declared nuclear facilities. 
 
To address these gaps, many private-sector advanced reactor developers have expressed 
commitments to the “three S’s” of safety, security, and safeguards. They also profess to ensure 
that these priorities are achieved “by design”—that is, carefully planned and built into the reactor 
design—to avoid costly and protracted back-fitting. The ballooning cost of safeguarding the 
Japanese reprocessing facility at Rokkasho underlines the necessity for early adoption of 
Safeguards-by-Design approaches to efficiently achieve safeguards objectives.[2], [3] 
 
Many developers, however, appear to treat the three S’s in the order described, with safeguards a 
distant third priority. The relative immaturity of many advanced reactor designs may explain the 
lack of focus on safeguards. Yet at times, safeguards appear explicitly underemphasized and 
even misunderstood. For example, state-level proliferation threats are often conflated with 
physical protection threats posed by non-state actors. The distinction between proliferation 
resistance and safeguards1 is also sometimes blurred, touting proliferation resistance benefits 
without detailing a safeguards approach. By comparison, developers appear to readily grasp 
safety and security considerations involving random equipment failures and malevolent human 
acts committed by others. 
 
The lack of focus on safeguards may stem from a reluctance by developers to view themselves as 
the potential enemy. Re-born in the minds of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, far removed from 
nuclear technology’s defense establishment origins, some advanced nuclear reactors are thought 
by their developers to serve a virtuous and moral purpose—saving the world from climate 
change rather than contributing to its destruction.[6] To many in these entrepreneurs, the 
anxieties of the nonproliferation community appear to be anachronistic and unrealistic—the 
result of hyperactive imaginations forged in a bygone era. Moreover, they conclude that nuclear 
power’s benefits far outweigh the risk of a civilian nuclear program leading to nuclear weapons. 
The notion that any reactor, even the venerable light water reactor, poses a proliferation risk is 
often downplayed by nuclear power’s proponents.2[7]  
 
                                                
1 Whereas proliferation resistance is defined as the “characteristic of [a Nuclear Energy System] that impedes the 
diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by the Host State seeking to acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”,[4] safeguards is an element of proliferation resistance 
concerned with the “...the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful 
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes 
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”[5] 
2 Arguably, advanced reactor developers could embrace this argument i.e. if existing designs are acceptable for 
international sale, then many advanced reactors could be as well. 
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While cases of diversion and misuse of civilian nuclear power facilities have been rare, this view 
glosses over the role of effective safeguards to achieving this outcome. As no nuclear reactor is 
proliferation-proof, an inadequately safeguarded reactor may be the most prone to proliferation. 
In the case of a light water reactor, a state may come to view low burn-up fuel in the core as an 
attractive source of weapons usable plutonium were it not for the likelihood of detection by 
safeguards.   
Recognizing the importance of safeguards to achieving nonproliferation objectives, this working 
paper offers a high-level examination of selected advanced nuclear technologies with the dual 
goals of: 1) elevating safeguards considerations in the minds of advanced reactor developers and 
investors, and 2) raising awareness of emerging technologies amongst the safeguards 
community. In addition to outlining potential gaps in safeguards practices, the paper also 
identifies research to draw down these risks. 
Of the systems under active exploration by private-sector reactor developers, three classes of 
nuclear and nuclear-related technologies appear to be generating significant interest: 1) 
micronuclear or very small modular reactors (vSMRs) for use in remote areas, 2) molten salt 
reactors with liquid fuel, and on the balance-of-plant side, 3) thermal energy storage and dry 
cooling to cope with market distortions and water stress. These systems are only a sample of the 
technologies under exploration by developers. The focus on them, and the potential safeguards 
challenges they present, should not be construed as a condemnation, merely part of the process 
of promoting effective and efficient safeguards. 
  
Micronuclear reactors 
While lacking a widely accepted definition, micro-nuclear or vSMRs are generally lower in 
power output than small modular reactors.3 Of the vSMR designs evaluated by a recent study 
conducted for Canada’s Ontario Ministry of Energy, electrical power output ranged from a 
couple to a few dozen MWe.[8] Such reactors may find markets supplying electrical power and 
process heat to small communities and industrial operations (e.g., oil and gas production, mining 
operations, military installations) in remote arctic and island areas currently reliant upon costly 
and unreliable diesel generation.[8]–[14]  
For many micronuclear design concepts, factory prefabrication with minimal in-field 
construction activities incorporates many of the lessons learned by the U.S. Army when it 
constructed small reactors at remote sites with short construction seasons and high installation 
cost rates.[15], [16] From 1957 to 1976, the U.S. Army built and operated several small reactors 
based on light water and gas reactor technology ranging in size from 3 to 45MWt, including the 
PM-3A reactor at McMurdo Station in Antarctica (Error! Reference source not found.). The 
military advantages of these reactors included “the reduced logistics load for transportation 
systems, the resistance of the nuclear power plant to damage because of its inherent heavy 
construction, and the suitability of the nuclear power plant for underground construction because 
of its lack of combustion gases.” One disadvantage cited was “the possible contamination of a 
small area in the case of destruction of a nuclear power plant.”[14] 
                                                
3 Small modular reactors are defined as producing less than 300MWe in output.[8] 
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Figure 1 PM-3A reactor components arriving by ship at McMurdo Station, Antarctica 
In addition to presenting some of the same advantages of these past systems, new micro-nuclear 
designs may also improve the safeguardability of the system on the whole. In particular, some 
micronuclear designs incorporate difficult-to-access, long-life cores, which could present 
intrinsic physical barriers to diversion and make it possible to maintain continuity of knowledge 
over nuclear material over decade-long timescales. Yet, developers also must strike a balance 
between guarding against unauthorized access and facilitating access by international inspectors 
who will need to conduct periodic inspections. For instance, the designs of sealing systems, 
reactor internals, and other physical barriers should allow for regular physical inventory taking 
and design information verification.[17], [18] Special instrumentation (e.g., ultrasonic under 
sodium viewing and active neutron interrogation fork detectors [19], [20]) will be needed for 
designs with opaque coolants (e.g., sodium or lead) to verify the identity of serialized fuel 
assemblies, and perform gross and partial defect tests. 
Siting these reactors in remote locations may have mixed effects for safeguards. Their 
remoteness may raise barriers to diversion and misuse, but they may also disproportionally 
increase the costs of in-field safeguards activities in comparison to larger, more centrally located 
facilities.[17] While not an exact analogue, security requirements suffer from similar 
diseconomies of scale. Estimates of protective guard force requirements to satisfy two-person 
rules and achieve adequate protection for the 10MWe 4S reactor proposed for Galena, Alaska, 
represented a major component of staffing and operational costs.[21] Efficiently achieving 
safeguards objectives in these locations would likely entail extensive use of remote and 
unattended monitoring systems operating with high assurances of data integrity and authenticity 
to achieve “operational transparency” and “virtual access” to the reactor.[17] End-of-life 
considerations may also contribute to long-lasting safeguards burdens. These reactors, some with 
low burn-up cores at end-of-life, may become long-term liabilities if stranded at far-flung sites 
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Molten Salt Reactors 
Molten salt reactors (MSR, Figure 2) appear to have attained “flavor-of-the-day” status amongst 
many advanced reactor developers. While wide variations in designs preclude generalization 
(e.g., thermal vs. fast neutron spectrum, thorium vs. uranium fueled, breeder vs. burner, etc.), the 
use of fluid fuel rather than solid fuel is the distinguishing feature of all MSR designs.[22]–[24] 
The intrinsic features and fuel cycles of many molten salt designs promise to increase 
proliferation resistance by utilizing low-attractiveness, homogenous fuel; by burning plutonium 
inventories in the case of low conversion ratio systems; and by reducing demand for fuel cycle 
services, such as enrichment and reprocessing.[24]–[29] Nevertheless, it bears repeating that no 
design yet conceived, including thorium-fueled MSRs, is completely proliferation proof.[30] 
 
Figure 2. Schematic of a Molten Salt Reactor [31] 
Regardless of design features, a model (generic) facility safeguards approach is a key need for 
this class of reactors utilizing fluid fuel.4 Absent this guidance, the acceptability of notional 
safeguards approaches, such as those where nuclear material “checks in, but doesn’t check out,” 
is questionable. Indeed, the IAEA anticipates the need for significant research and development 
efforts to develop a generic safeguards approach: 
 “… designers should be aware that such reactors cannot be considered item facilities. … more stringent nuclear 
material accountancy measures will likely be required to verify the quantities, locations and movements of the 
nuclear material. These measures can include, but are not limited to, fuel flow monitors, seals, video 
surveillance, the use of sensors to trigger other sensors, more accurate NDA measurements and sampling plans 
that select additional items for verification. Most of this instrumentation does not yet exist and a significant 
R&D effort can be expected.”[3] 
 
                                                
4 A model (generic) facility safeguards approach is the recommended approach for a particular facility type 
developed for a postulated reference plant that specifies inspection goals and safeguards activities accounting for 
diversion assumptions, available safeguards measures, facility design information and practices, etc. 
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Toward an MSR safeguards approach. A safeguards approach for MSRs could be envisioned as 
a hybrid of safeguards practices at item reactors (e.g., LWRs), fuel cycle facilities (e.g., fuel 
fabrication or reprocessing facilities), and on-load reactors where refueling and defueling occurs 
at power (e.g., CANDU and PBMR reactors).  
A conceptual safeguards approach for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) illustrates a 
case of an on-load reactor where item accountancy is not entirely applicable because of the use 
of unserialized, semi-indistinguishable pebble fuel. Like the PBMR, a MSR safeguards approach 
may comprise three principal material balance areas (MBA): a storage area each for fresh and 
spent fuel that are treated as item facilities, and a reactor area treated as a non-item facility where 
an “…engineered solution [prevents] significant accrual of MUF (Materials Unaccounted 
For).…”[19]  
Fuel receiving, storage, and shipping MBAs can be treated as item facilities by sealing and 
serializing containers of solidified fuel salt. Like other on-load reactors such as CANDU, fuel-
item transfer activities from receiving areas to the core, and from the core to storage and 
shipping areas, could be assayed and monitored by integrated instrument systems backed by dual 
layers of containment and surveillance measures that minimize common tampering or failure 
modes.[32] In fuel storage areas treated as item MBAs, the primary advantage is the absence of 
MUF. Nevertheless, in the event of a loss of item integrity, materials accountancy will play a key 
role in reestablishing continuity of knowledge. For example, following the 2003 fuel handling 
incident at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant in Hungary, the rubble from damaged fuel assemblies 
was containerized and reverified with “gram precision” with gamma- and neutron-based 
nondestructive assay techniques.[33] 
The principal MSR safeguards challenge will likely arise from the rate of MUF accrual in the 
MBA bounding the core. This will be particularly true for reactors with long intervals between 
anticipated maintenance outages with infrequent opportunities for inventory verification. For the 
limited number of non-item facilities that currently exist, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has relied upon safeguards approaches that assure continuity of knowledge—an 
approach that may lead to costly and complicated containment and surveillance (C/S) systems. In 
these instances, should continuity be lost, the inability to reverify inventories through materials 
accountancy risks a noncompliance finding for the remainder of the facility’s lifetime.[19] This 
possibility reinforces the fundamental importance of materials accountancy in a safeguards 
approach to recover from losses of continuity and to guard against unanticipated mechanisms for 
material losses.[34] 
While materials accountancy at MSRs will be more involved than item facilities such as solid-
fueled fast breeder reactors, accountancy requirements may be less demanding than a 
reprocessing facility. The absence of unirradiated direct-use material in many MSR concepts 
distinguishes them from facilities like aqueous reprocessing facilities. Material throughput in 
MSRs is also generally orders of magnitude lower than large reprocessing facilities, potentially 
reducing accounting uncertainties associated with material flows. However, measurement 
uncertainties associated with in-process inventories may significantly contribute to MUF. 
Uncertainties in reactor physics calculations of in-core inventory changes also require 
assessment. For LWR spent fuel, uncertainties in plutonium content range from 3% to 10% and 
sometimes larger, and depend on correlating measurements of gamma and neutron emissions to 
reactor physics calculations.[35], [36] For reactors that process fuel salt (e.g., to remove gaseous 
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and particulate fission products [25]), resultant waste streams should also be assayed to ensure 
that any residual fissile material is practicably irrecoverable.[37] 
Table 1. Comparison of fast breeder reactor, a liquid fueled molten salt reactor, and a large 
reprocessing facility. 










Item facility Non-item reactor Bulk-handling 
facility 
Inputs Unirradiated Direct 
Use 
Indirect Use Irradiated Direct 
Use 
Outputs Irradiated Direct 
Use 
Irradiated Direct Use Unirradiated Direct 
Use 




Throughput Fraction of core 
load as items 
<<800MTHM/year 800 MTHM/year 
In-Process Inventory Core load as items >4MT Irradiated 
Direct Use 
4MT 
Operation Period Months to years Up to years 200 days 
 
As noted by the IAEA, much of the needed instrumentation for implementing MSR safeguards 
requires development.[3] Accurately measuring the fissile content of the reactor’s core could 
involve periodic reverification of core mass or volume, which would require accounting for 
dimensional changes of the reactor vessel, as well as guarding against new diversion strategies, 
such as a “brick in the toilet tank” that would displace fluid fuel for diversion. Pyroprocessing 
instrumentation might be adapted for molten salt reactor operations (e.g., voltammetric and 
potentiometric sensors, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy, etc.[38]–[41]), as nuclear-based, 
non-destructive assay instrumentation may be blinded by the intense neutron and gamma 
background of freshly irradiated molten salt fuel.[42]  
Containment and surveillance systems adapted to molten salt reactor environments will be 
essential, complementary measures to material accounting to cover diversion pathways and 
enhance safeguards efficiency. Many of these systems may need to operate in high radiation 
fields nearby systems containing irradiated fuel salt and fission products. While these radiation 
fields may be considered an intrinsic barrier to diversion, remote maintenance capabilities 
necessary for operations are a potential route to state-level diversion and misuse. Monitoring of 
this equipment may thus be necessary to exclude their misuse and to detect the introduction of 
undeclared equipment into process areas. 
Process monitoring. Process monitoring approaches have the potential to provide additional 
assurances of non-diversion. Unlike solid-fueled heterogeneous cores, the homogeneity of MSR 
cores potentially simplifies measurements of core composition and supports near-real-time 
accountancy of material inventories—provided that sampling biases can be excluded. Physics-
based signatures might also contribute to assurances of non-diversion. Prompt and protracted 
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diversions of fuel salt leading to abnormal changes in reactivity could trigger an inventory 
verification and other efforts to investigate these anomalous signatures.[25] Process monitoring 
can also serve as a consistency check on declarations, as a means of localizing material losses in 
time, and by assisting in the resolution of other safeguards anomalies.  
State Level Concept. Beyond the reactor, advanced fuel cycles with minimal demands for 
sensitive fuel cycle services, such as enrichment and reprocessing, might also lead to 
improvements in safeguards effectiveness and efficiency. One way these gains could be realized 
is by appealing to the holistic nature of safeguards implementation under the IAEA’s State Level 
Concept. Safeguards implemented on a facility-level basis, which have been the norm to ensure 
uniform safeguards implementation across states, give little consideration to a state’s nuclear 
capabilities and other state specific factors. For example, requirements for the timely detection of 
diversion from reactors assume the existence of a clandestine reprocessing capability within the 
state. This conservatism is thought to lead to overly stringent timeliness requirements in states 
with limited fuel cycle capabilities. By considering a state’s nuclear capabilities as a whole, 
reactor technologies without demand for enrichment and reprocessing might contribute to a 
Broader Conclusion that “…no indications had been found...” that “…give rise to a proliferation 
concern.”[43], [44] With such assurances in place, safeguards could be applied with lower 
frequency and intensity at reactors “upstream” of reprocessing on material acquisition pathways.	
 
Balance-of-plant technologies 
Some emerging nuclear power-related technologies, such as thermal energy storage and dry 
cooling, affect the non-nuclear supporting systems of a nuclear power plant known as the 
“balance-of-plant.” These non-nuclear technologies could affect safeguards implementation as 
much as the nuclear systems. Designed to help power plant operators cope with market 
distortions and the impact of water stress on operations, these technologies could affect 
international inspectors’ abilities to detect “… undeclared nuclear material or activities in the 
State as a whole” under a state’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.[45] For instance 
developments in thermal energy storage and dry cooling technologies that affect a plant’s heat 
signature could help states evade detection and monitoring by commercial satellites.[46] This in 
turn may necessitate more effective and efficient verification by the IAEA and its member states 
to provide credible assurances that all nuclear material remains in peaceful purposes. 
Thermal energy storage. Thermal energy storage technologies that allow a nuclear plant to store 
excess output while electricity demand is low could increase the profitability of nuclear units in 
distorted energy markets where electricity prices are depressed and even negative at times. This 
exact situation is contributing to the premature closure of nuclear power plants with limited load 
following capabilities.[47] Thermal energy storage systems enable baseload nuclear plants to 
deliver “on demand peak power” by shifting power output to more profitable times of the 
day.[48], [49] ( 
Figure 3)	
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Figure 3 Schematic of a nuclear-renewable hybrid system incorporating thermal energy storage, 
extracted from [48] 
These same capabilities, if refined and adapted, could enable nuclear reactors and other facilities 
that typically emit thermal signatures to remain hidden and hinder the monitoring of known 
unsafeguarded facilities (e.g., Yongbyon, North Korea[50]). For instance, steam accumulators, 
packed-bed thermal storage, sensible heat systems, hot-rock/hot-air systems, and other 
technologies could hinder detection by delaying thermal energy releases (e.g., steam plumes, 
warm water outfalls) to periods between observations (e.g., satellite overpasses).[49], [51]–[53] 
However, heat rejection equipment (e.g., cooling towers) may be more conspicuous if designed 
for the combined output of the reactor and storage system. For known reactors, thermal 
signatures may become a less reliable indicator of operational history and fissile material 
production. These considerations reinforce the need for onsite measures to verify reactor 
operations and shutdown status.[46] 
Dry cooling. Comparable issues arise from heat rejection technologies designed to cope with 
growing strains on water resources.[54] Nuclear reactors employing cooling technologies with 
minimal evaporative water losses (e.g., air cooling, sorption-based cooling, multimode 
[convection/ radiant] cooling) can now be sited in areas where wet cooling—which relies on a 
source of cooling water—is currently infeasible. (Figure 4)  
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Figure 4 Areas excluded for small reactors due to inadequate stream flow for cooling water 
(shaded pink) may now accommodate reactors with dry cooling systems, extracted from [55] 
If reactors can be sited further from water sources, then this enlarges the space within which to 
search for clandestine nuclear facilities, potentially requiring new search instruments and 
techniques.[56] While “large and hot” cooling systems, such as air-cooled condensers and 
radiative cooling, may be readily detected via remote sensing, “small and cold” systems pose 
greater challenges. For example, the 20MWt SM-1A reactor at Fort Greely, Alaska, utilized a 
well doublet to reinject groundwater heated by the reactor. The system drew groundwater from 
two onsite cooling water wells rated at 1.44 million gallons/day each and injected heated water 
into a dry well 215 yards north of the facility capable of accepting 2.16 million gallons/day.[15], 
[57] Though necessity likely drove this development at Fort Greely, its adaptability for 
concealment purposes illustrates the potential unintentional consequences of these technologies. 
Thermal signatures of a well doublet may be indiscernible in coarsely pixelated thermal infrared 
imagery if heat signatures remain buried deep underground or are small in size. Signatures that 




This paper presents several of the many safeguards challenges likely to be posed by new designs 
being pursued by the advanced nuclear reactor industry. As examinations of the design features 
of some micronuclear and molten salt reactors suggest, identifying these challenges early in the 
design process improves the odds of cost-effectively implementing safeguards by adapting 
existing safeguards approaches, modifying facility design, and/or developing innovative 
safeguards measures and approaches.[58] While resolving some emerging safeguards issues may 
entail significant research and development (e.g., nuclear instrumentation), other considerations 
are relatively mundane matters implemented relatively easily in the design process (e.g., 
electrical power for safeguards equipment). 
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Additional safeguards challenges may arise as nuclear designs and operations evolve in response 
to markets and environmental constraints. The emerging balance-of-plant technologies 
highlighted here point to the need to strengthen safeguards measures to verify reactor operations 
and the completeness of state declarations. The development of thermal storage and dry cooling 
technologies may entail a “darkening of the skies,” demanding greater earth observing 
capabilities and deepening the IAEA’s reliance on member state capabilities.[59]  
Complicating matters further, some of these advances will be made by private-sector entities 
concerned with protecting intellectual property. This could lead nuclear developments to occur 
less transparently than government-led nuclear power programs. These same commercial 
sensitivities may stifle early engagement between developers and the international safeguards 
community. Should these technologies take-off, limited safeguards resources may be quickly 
strained. 
Creative safeguards solutions therefore need to emerge as quickly as the technologies 
themselves. Doing so requires engagement by all stakeholders. While the safeguards community 
should strive to anticipate developments and define safeguards approaches, an anticipatory 
strategy may prove inadequate without efforts to instill a safeguards culture among developers. 
Doing so requires the nonproliferation community to be seen as solution-oriented rather than 
engaging in what is often perceived as interminable obstructionism. Similarly, advanced reactor 
developers must avoid downplaying nonproliferation anxieties. For utilities and investors 
seeking access to international markets, safeguards-by-design represents a proactive means of 
drawing-down political and investment risks early in the design process. 
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